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To meet the increasing security challenges of the 21 st Century, regional combatant commanders should refocus planning capabilities to exploit all the instruments of national power in order to achieve security and stability objectives world-wide. To date, unity of effort during Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations has largely been achieved through cooperation. However, pre-coordinated and deliberate unified action remains illusive at the operational level. In reference to the war in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently stated, "A lot of Defense Department folks wonder where the rest of the government is in this war. There is clearly a need for greater interagency collaboration." 2 However, a review of the literature suggests no meaningful progress has been made to institutionalize and move interagency collaboration and deliberate planning forward, undermining unity of effort and accomplishment of objectives. This paper argues that a critical gap in military and interagency planning capability for security and stability operations 3 exists at the operational level: to fill this gap functional joint-interagency subunified commands under each combatant commander, and a supporting interagency functional command could better achieve post-combat objectives.
This paper begins by providing background for security and stability operations outlining current United States policy and corresponding capabilities which have developed from these policies. Next, analysis is provided focused on security and stability operations in Iraq to demonstrate continued lack of deliberate SSTR planning at the operational level resulting in degraded capability. The paper continues by suggesting why a new functional structure may be important to the combatant commanders. Finally, a recommended solution to better plan and execute security and stability operations is provided, that aligns corresponding functional capability with requirements at the operational level. The new structure, modeled after U.S.
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), proposes integrating the interagency to enable civil-military cooperation that may be better suited to accomplish post-conflict objectives.
Background
The U.S. Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for SSTR describes stability operations as central elements conducted to assist a state or region under serious stress. It suggests the primary objectives of stability operations are as follows; to help manage tension, provide security, establish economic and political systems, provide essential services, humanitarian assistance, rebuild socio-economic and physical infrastructure, and create the foundation for long-term development. 4 President Bush described stability operations in Iraq stating, "The work ahead includes building a stronger Army, creating a stable currency, guaranteeing property rights, establishing an impartial judicial system, improving local police forces, and making infrastructure improvements." 5 This paper examines all of the above aspects of SSTR and recognizes security as a basic pre-condition required to enable stability.
The U.S. Department of State (DoS) indicates the United States has been involved in 17 major stability operations in the past 15 years and the military contributed the largest portion of those efforts. 6 The DoS suggests planning for those operations has been largely ad hoc. force in Iraq has realized some success in establishing integrated interagency cooperation. 15 Despite these improvements in planning interagency/military capability directly aimed at supporting civil-military cooperation and SSTR requirements, there seems to be no permanent standing interagency structure at the operational level to synchronize efforts and perform operational analysis integrating lessons learned into future operations. A unit with authority beyond the limited advising capability of the JIACG could fill this gap. The JCMOTF and the CMOC are temporary and more tactical in nature designed to support achievement of a specific objective. They normally stand-up after operations have been initiated making deliberate integrated planning difficult. This results in significant gaps in capability until they can be fully organized by which point they are largely reactionary.
With only seven representatives on average and all from different agencies, the JIACG serves as an advisory group to the GCC. 16 Within the JIACG, planning capability exists but is limited lacking authority and capability to influence long-term planning for sustained security and stability operations. Finally, organizations are not standardized across the interagency further complicating planning. For example, the DoS is organized by countries and the DoD is organized by regions which are not aligned. This may cause gaps in deliberate planning focus across the interagency and at the operational level, which may be evident in achieving objectives.
Iraq: Evidence for the Need to Improve Interagency Collaborative Planning
Operation focus on establishing democracy. 18 The gap in consensus and interagency planning at the operational level in Iraq may be evident when Ambassador Jerry Bremer unilaterally decided to dissolve the Iraqi Army putting thousands of soldiers on the streets without a way to feed their families. A hollow force remained to provide security and conduct stability operations.
This political action counteracted weeks of military planning conducted by CENTCOM and other agencies. 19 Collective wisdom today suggests the rise in the insurgency was fueled by this action. Both the Secretary of State and Defense were unaware of the plan to dissolve the Army, as was the senior American military commander on the ground. 20 Fallout from that decision and the lack of integrated, interagency planning resonates today.
The special inspector general for Iraq Reconstruction, Stewart Bowen stated that the DoD had no plan to reconstruct the government in Iraq after the invasion, or to restore infrastructure. 21 Mr. Bowen highlighted a poor working relationship between the Iraq embassy and the military, and attributed part of the reconstruction failures in Iraq to the State Department's inability to provide civilian expertise capacity. 22 Additionally, as a result of faulty assumptions that led to inadequate planning, security was never sufficiently achieved.
The RAND corporation concludes in their 2008 study of Iraq that DoD planners made little use of existing operations plans. They also suggest the assumption that interagency and intergovernmental support for reconstruction efforts would be provided was also false. 23 Finally, RAND concluded that the United States went into Iraq on a "best-case" assumption with inadequate military numbers. Unanticipated challenges were repeatedly encountered, civil capacity arrived late to the fight, and mixed competence played a large part in the failures. 24 The means available to build civil capacity did not match the requirements due to false assumptions in planning and policy shifts. 
SOCOM as a Model to Meet Functional Challenges
A similar functional organization has already proven successful balancing similar functional challenges. SOCOM and its subordinate Theater Special Operation Commands (TSOCs) is a unique structure that has demonstrated capability to plan and focus resources.
SOCOM as a functional command provides a structural model to follow in order to execute operations of elevated importance.
TSOCs are sub-unified commands designed to plan and execute the GCCs special operations missions including limited civil affairs activities when required. However, although TSOCs are responsible to the GCC, they also align priorities through the functional authority of SOCOM. With increased authority through flag officer leadership, sub-unified commands are standing organizations within unified commands authorized to conduct operations on a continuing basis and may be established on a geographic or functional basis. 26 Within the TSOC, special operations are assigned a single commander to improve unity of action through centralized direction. The TSOCs clear unity of command improves likelihood that planning is deliberate. TSOCs improve regional interface and provide a core around which Joint Task Forces can be organized. Through the sub-unified TSOC, the GCC has flexibility and exercises Operational Control (OPCON) of all assigned special operations forces. 27 They have experienced staffs with planning capability to help functional personnel fully integrate into theater operations, and component commanders understand their capabilities and requirements. SOCOM as the functional combatant command provides funding and forces to the sub-unified commands increasing flexibility of resources and capabilities. 28 A functional interagency structure for SSTR may create the same flexibility and leverage realized by SOCOM, but would expand it by integrating the interagency.
Relevance to the Combatant Commander
Operational concepts currently being developed by the S/CRS propose a series of teams from the tactical to strategic levels to plan and execute stability operations. The Advanced Civilian Team (ACTs) would operate at the operational and tactical level. 29 ACTs are still in development stage, however it is conceivable they will fall short of a robust and permanent standing planning capability. They will more likely be tied directly to specific objectives for specific stability operations such as in Iraq or Afghanistan.
The DoD would be part of the teams at every level to include the strategic Integration Planning Cell (IPC). However, it has already been suggested that the IPC should have the means to affect changes to Combatant Command plans. 30 million was directed to S/CRS for stability operations. However, the DoS has little capacity to ensure the money is allocated in the best interest of the United States with only 6,000
foreign service officers. 38 Enhanced planning through the proposed functional interagency structure could increase accountability of resources and aid GCCs in placing critical SSTR capabilities at decisive points.
DoS vs DoD as Lead Agent for SSTR Planning
The State Department has the preponderance of knowledge when it comes to country development issues. However, during the three years since its inception, S/CRS has not been able to acquire the funding or manpower to fulfill its responsibilities as evidenced in part by the Secretary of State and USAID requests for the DoD to fill 40 percent of 300 critical positions supporting stability operations in Iraq. 39 Ambassador Carlos Pascual, initial head of S/CRS suggested that a robust capability is still required to fulfill S/CRS mandates for SSTR. 40 Indeed, knowledge and expertise without capabilities and resources to plan and execute stability operations makes DoS leadership of SSTR untenable at least in the short term. Down the road the DoS may be both capable and more closely aligned to the mission making them better suited to lead SSTR efforts. 41 Until then, the proposed structure could improve SSTR planning efforts making them mutually supporting and better integrated with S/CRS planning efforts. The proposed structure could build on the DoD Joint Operating balance between stability and combat operations could be better achieved.
Counterargument and Rebuttal
Opponents of this paper could argue that the regional combatant commander is better suited to handle all operations within their region and a new functional command for SSTR would degrade unity of effort. Differences in planning priorities, understanding for regional influences, and lack of coordination between the joint interagency functional command and the GCC could cause friction and jeopardize a smooth transition to stability operations.
This argument is valid. However, a functional interagency command for SSTR could enhance the GCCs authority and control. The Unified Command Plan limits a unified functional commander's authority to only synchronizing, planning, and allocating forces unless specifically directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. The authority to execute operations remains with the GCC to best maintain unified action. 42 That said, unified action is described in U.S. Joint Publication 5-0 as " … including synchronization and/or integration of joint and multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental (IGO) and nongovernmental (NGO) organizations." 43 Under the proposed structure the GCCs could retain OPCON, but the functional interagency command could provide increased planning and resources improving GCC capabilities. The sub-unified commands under the GCC could provide focused leadership to improve unity of command and achieve unified action.
A Recommended Solution to Achieve Integrated Planning Through Unified Action
The JOC for SSTR suggests critical capabilities for stability operations include being able to systematically plan, allocate resources, and execute operations within an integrated framework. It also suggests unified action for SSTR must be achieved across the interagency and with multi-national NGO partners. 44 However, a team commissioned to revisit the 1986
Goldwater-Nichols Act for Government and Defense Reform, concluded that long-term planning is rarely conducted outside the DoD because they maintain the preponderance of trained planners and capabilities to perform SSTR. Supporting this paper's proposal, they also suggest GCCs should incorporate the interagency into campaign planning by creating standing core elements for SSTR led by an appointed officer to improve unity of effort. and humanitarian assistance may help synchronize these mutually supporting capabilities.
To achieve this, the JOC for SSTR is mirrored in mission sets by the S/CRS operating concept, outlining five major mission elements as follows; establish and maintain a safe and secure environment, deliver humanitarian assistance, reconstitute critical infrastructure and essential services, support economic development, and establish representative effective government. 48 The proposed HASSOC structure in figure one below incorporates these and serves as a baseline for GCCs to modify to meet regional needs. This functional alignment should better enable planners to aid the host country in stability and reconstruction efforts. 
Conclusion
Weak and failing states may disrupt regional stability and have adverse impacts worldwide if left to their own demise. However, stability operations designed to rescue failing states are costly in life and resources and difficult to maintain without international support.
For this reason, the Secretary of Defense has placed the importance of stability operations equal to combat operations. However, the interagency has hardly begun to make progress in meeting stability objectives. Iraq serves as a prime example of how uncoordinated planning for stability operations has led to false assumptions, unacceptable risk, and improper allocation of resources jeopardizing losing the peace. Unified action at the operational level could be better achieved by creating a joint interagency functional command and sub-unified command structure for SSTR to improve planning and focus capabilities to requirements.
General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, recently stated in reference to the release of the new Army Operations Manual, " … the new version of the field manual captures a new operational concept where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously. This has major ramifications for training, planning and decision-making, and represents a significant challenge to military forces." 51 The Army has created and aligned doctrine for security and stability operations with interagency concepts and is initiating planning in accordance with the given strategic guidance. It is clear national policy and doctrine have been updated and large organizations are being set in motion to 'win the peace'. A robust structure plugged into the strategic level of government through HASSCOM and linking the tactical with the operational level through
HASSOCs on a permanent basis could better steer interagency efforts in the same direction through integrated planning. Integrated interagency planning could be focused and resources better leveraged to enable operational commanders to apply their art to SSTR operations.
